


DTR-0519

31 JUL 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, DIMQS
SUBJECT : Internal Organization for Crisis Management
REFERENCE : DD/MQS 74-2743 (MCA-100)

I have no comments or recommendations to make regarding the referenced proposal. I would be interested in knowing what the Management Committee decides so that our course materials can be kept current.


Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

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DTR-0486

17 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CIA Management Committee
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM : Chief, CIA Operations Center
SUBJECT : Internal Organization for Crisis Management

1. ACTION REQUESTED: Approval is requested to establish the CIA Operations Center as the focal point for coordinating those efforts of the various Agency elements involved in what is generally referred to as "crisis management".

2. BACKGROUND:

a. The participation of various internal elements of the Agency in activities related to NSDM-242 indicated a need for more centralized attention to coordinating these activities which affect Intelligence Community efforts to assure the National Command Authority that our crisis management procedures are adequate to meet whatever contingencies may arise from this NSDM or from other international events constituting an emergency.

b. In dealing with the component parts of crisis management--planning for crisis and war time support to the military, participation in joint exercises, continuity of operations (emergency) planning, vital records et al--it seems clear that the Agency's activities are not adequately organized and coordinated to ensure that our crisis management procedures are responsive to the spirit of the NSDM-242 charter. Areas of Agency activity which require more specific guidance and better coordinated efforts include:

(1) The ability of the Agency to organize itself so that it can continue operations in the event of an emergency, in this context, one of a nuclear nature. This is now handled by several elements of the DDM&S under the headings of emergency planning (OL) and vital materials (Office of the DDM&S).

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(2) The need for a more precise definition of the Agency's role in supporting the military in accordance with NSCID-5. This would necessarily include Agency participation in regular joint exercises with the military to test either the cooperation of the components and/or the communications, command and control instruments that would support them in times of crisis. This is now the responsibility of the DDO with support at times from the Office of Communications and OTS, DDS&T.

(3) The involvement of the CIA Operations Center in a variety of crisis management activities and groups on the subject of the adequacy of information flows, communications systems and warning.

c. The above activities as far as I can determine continue with no specific guidance or framework to tie them together and without any organizational impetus to ensure that the activities are coordinated.


3. DISCUSSION: It seems, especially in the NSDM-242 context, that the Agency must take a new look at its internal "crisis management procedures". A first task would be to define these procedures then identify gaps in them and through informal consultation group decide how the Agency should be arrayed to deal with them. It is not my purpose to suggest the formation of yet another organization, but rather to suggest a consultative/coordinating mechanism so that whatever is done in this general regard takes full cognizance of its effect on the other players and the Agency in general. As a case in point it seems to me that the Command Relationship Agreement, now currently undergoing serious scrutiny in the JCS, does have a definite effect on our stations and our embassies abroad and their role in active theatres of war, and in turn their relationships with their Headquarters. The fundamental question is how valid is paragraph eight of NSCID-5 in today's world. I believe a case can be made for the view that the thinking on which this paragraph was based is archaic and has been rendered inoperative by our experience in Laos and Vietnam and would indeed be rendered inoperative if, as under NSDM-242, we are considering at least the option of limited, regional nuclear employment, as opposed to the CRA based former choices of conventional warfare of a WW II variety, or Armageddon.

4. RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Management Committee approve the following to accomplish a reassessment of the Agency's crisis management posture:

a. That all DD's designate a representative to discuss these matters with the Chief of the Operations Center toward the end of developing a coordinated report and series of recommendations for the DCI on this subject.

b. That in dealing with external Agencies on these topics, the CIA Operations Center be designated as the focal point of contact.

c. That ongoing activities in this regard be held in abeyance to the extent possible until this study is completed and reviewed by the Management Committee.


Chief, CIA Operations Center

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APPROVED _____

Date

DISAPPROVED _____

Date

Distribution:

Original + 11 - Secretary, CIA Management Committee

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